Honesty plays a key role in social and economic interactions and is crucial for societal functioning. However, breaches of honesty are pervasive and cause significant societal and economic problems that can affect entire nations. Despite its importance, remarkably little is known about the neurobiological mechanisms supporting honest behavior. We demonstrate that honesty can be increased in humans with transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) over the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. Participants (n = 145) completed a die-rolling task where they could misreport their outcomes to increase their earnings, thereby pitting honest behavior against personal financial gain. Cheating was substantial in a control condition but decreased dramatically when neural excitability was enhanced with tDCS. This increase in honesty could not be explained by changes in material self-interest or moral beliefs and was dissociated from participants' impulsivity, willingness to take risks, and mood. A follow-up experiment (n = 156) showed that tDCS only reduced cheating when dishonest behavior benefited the participants themselves rather than another person, suggesting that the stimulated neural process specifically resolves conflicts between honesty and material self-interest. Our results demonstrate that honesty can be strengthened by noninvasive interventions and concur with theories proposing that the human brain has evolved mechanisms dedicated to control complex social behaviors.
D
ishonest behavior is pervasive and carries important economic and societal consequences (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) . For example, illegal tax evasion is thought to account for over 5% of the world's gross domestic product (7) , and total bribes to public officials are estimated at over US $1 trillion annually (8) . Furthermore, recent business scandals such as the Volkswagen emission fabrications and several interest rate manipulations in the financial industry have eroded trust in the integrity of the corporate world (5) . Although there are formal laws and regulations to limit cheating, honest behavior is often difficult or impossible to monitor and enforce. Individuals therefore face an internal trade-off between honesty and personal material gain.
The conflict between honesty and material self-interest is a central feature of human social life, and honesty is exalted in virtually all world religions and moral value systems. Despite substantial interest in the origins and determinants of honest behavior in biology (9) , behavioral sciences (2, 10) , and economics (4, 11) , little is known about the neural processes that enable humans to resolve conflicts between honesty and personal financial gain. Understanding the neural processes involved in these "costly" displays of honesty could offer important new perspectives on the evolutionary origins and development of honest behavior (9, 12) and may also aid in designing interventions for enhancing lie detection (13) and the treatment of pathological cheating (14) .
The neural basis of honesty remains largely unexplored in humans because previous studies have almost exclusively relied on instructed-lying paradigms, which examine deception ability rather than dishonest behavior (15) . Participants in these studies are explicitly instructed by an experimenter to make untruthful statements, and they do not benefit materially from lying. Thus, participants neither genuinely decide to be honest nor face a trade-off between honest behavior and material gain. Other studies have used signaling games to study the neural basis of deception (16, 17) , but such tasks potentially confound honesty with strategic motives [e.g., if senders believe opponents will do the opposite of what they recommend, then a sender will actually "deceive" the opponent by telling the truth (18) ]. Only one neuroimaging study has investigated cheating in a setting that involved a moral trade-off between honesty and financial gain (19) . In that study, honest behavior correlated with brain activity in a network comprising areas of the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (rDLPFC). However, these correlational findings cannot determine whether heightened neural activity genuinely causes honest behavior or simply reflects a functionally irrelevant byproduct of honest behavior.
Here, we present causal evidence for a neural mechanism that regulates honest behavior by applying transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) in 145 subjects confronted with a real tradeoff between honesty and personal material gain. tDCS is a noninvasive method to modulate neural excitability in healthy humans by applying weak electric currents to the scalp (20) (a detailed description of the experimental procedures is available in SI Appendix). To enhance neural excitability exogenously, we applied anodal tDCS (n = 49) over the rDLPFC region
Significance
Honesty affects almost every aspect of social and economic life. We conducted experiments in which participants could earn considerable amounts of money by cheating on a die-rolling task. Cheating was substantial but decreased by more than one-half during transcranial direct current stimulation over the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. This stimulation-induced increase in honesty was functionally specific: It did not affect other types of behavioral control related to self-interest, risktaking, and impulsivity. Moreover, cheating was only reduced when it benefited the participants themselves rather than another person. Thus, the human brain implements specialized processes that enable us to remain honest when faced with opportunities to cheat for personal material gain. Importantly, these processes can be strengthened by external interventions. previously found to be active when subjects decided to behave honestly (figure S1B of ref. 19 ) (SI Appendix, Fig. S1 ). By applying excitatory tDCS over this specific region, we aimed to strengthen behaviorally relevant neural activity and thereby enhance honest behavior. We also measured behavior in two additional groups where we applied tDCS either to decrease neural excitability [cathodal (n = 49)] or to leave it unchanged [sham (n = 47)]. Random assignment to conditions generated three groups that were matched in socioeconomic status, cognitive ability, and personality. Moreover, the three stimulation conditions were conducted in a double-blind manner, were perceived similarly by the participants, and did not differ reliably in terms of participants' mood, alertness, and calmness. Thus, any effects of the three tDCS interventions on honest behavior cannot be explained in terms of preexisting group differences or changes in beliefs and emotions (SI Appendix).
During stimulation, we measured cheating using an incentivized and unobtrusive die-rolling task (10, 11) that has been shown to predict rule-violating behavior reliably in real-world settings (21, 22) . The die-rolling task was embedded in a battery of control tasks (SI Appendix) that served two purposes: First, they allowed us to measure and control for other aspects of choice behavior that may be affected by the stimulation (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) . Second, they helped to disguise the purpose of the experiment by reducing the salience of the die-rolling task. In the die-rolling task, subjects were instructed to report the outcomes of 10 die rolls using a computer interface. Each roll could result with 50% probability in either a gain of 9 Swiss francs or no change in payoff. Before each roll, a computer screen indicated which outcomes would yield the monetary payoff. Given that the participants could earn up to 90 Swiss francs (about US $90 at the time of testing) in this task, they faced a substantial material incentive to overreport the number of successful die rolls. To ensure fully private decisions, participants completed the task anonymously outside of the experimenter's and other participants' view. Although this prevented us from identifying individual acts of cheating with certainty, we can determine the degree of cheating associated with each tDCS intervention by comparing the mean percentage of reported successful die rolls against the 50% benchmark implied by fully honest reporting.
Cheating was substantial in the neurally ineffective sham condition (Fig. 1A) . Compared with the honesty benchmark of 50%, participants reported 68% successful die rolls on average (95% confidence interval: 63-74%). This result implies that cheating occurred in 37% of all responses, assuming that participants never misreported to their disadvantage (SI Appendix). Additional simulations and Bayesian analyses demonstrate that given our sample size and observations, the probability that the subjects reported completely honestly is virtually zero (SI Appendix, Fig. S3 ). Fig. 1B shows the binomial distribution of successful die rolls expected if everyone behaved honestly and the empirically observed distribution for sham tDCS. A total of 8.5% of the subjects reported successful outcomes for all 10 die rolls (thereby maximizing their earnings), which is significantly higher than the 0.1% expected under the binomial distribution (P < 0.001, binomial test). Subjects who claimed nine, eight, and seven successful die rolls were also significantly overrepresented (P < 0.001, P = 0.001, and P = 0.002; binomial tests), suggesting that many of them cheated on some but not all possible occasions. Such incomplete cheating is commonly observed in similar paradigms (10, 11) .
To test whether enhanced neural excitability promotes honest behavior, we compared the distribution of die rolls in anodal and sham tDCS. Anodal stimulation over the rDLPFC substantially reduced the average percentage of successful die rolls to 58% (P = 0.005, rank-sum test; Fig. 1A ). [Note that the effect of anodal tDCS on honest behavior is also statistically significant if we adjust the P value for multiple hypothesis testing across the control tasks using a conservative Bonferroni correction (P* = 0.049).] This result corresponds to an implied cheating rate of 15%, a figure that is nearly 60% lower than that observed in the sham condition. In SI Appendix, we report complementary simulations and Bayesian analyses, showing that the observed differences between the die roll successes for anodal and sham tDCS are very unlikely to have been generated by chance. For example, our simulations show that only five of 10,000 experiments with a similarly sized sample of completely honest subjects would show a similar or larger tDCS effect than the effect we observed.
In the analysis of the different reported outcomes, we no longer found significant overreporting of nine, eight, and seven successful die rolls in the anodal condition (P = 1.000, P = 0.168, and P = 0.369; binomial tests; Fig. 1D ). However, the fraction of subjects who reported the maximum outcome of 10 successful rolls remained essentially unchanged at 8.2%. This finding suggests that anodal tDCS predominantly reduced cheating in participants who actually pondered the trade-off between honesty and financial gain, but not in participants who were committed to maximizing their payoff.
Although anodal tDCS decreased cheating, we did not find opposite behavioral effects of cathodal tDCS ( Fig. 1 A and C) . Participants in the cathodal condition reported 67% successful die rolls (95% confidence interval: 61-73%), which was not significantly different from the success rate reported in the sham stimulation (P = 0.635, rank-sum test) but was significantly higher than the rate reported in anodal tDCS (P = 0.018, ranksum test). There are two plausible explanations for why cathodal tDCS did not increase cheating. First, several studies suggest that cathodal tDCS induces less stable cognitive behavioral effects than anodal tDCS (28) . Second, the high cheating rate in the sham condition [which is similar, for example, to the cheating rate in a sample of prisoners (21) ] entails that there was little room for tDCS to increase incomplete cheating further. Thus, cathodal stimulation may not induce transitions from incomplete Asterisks indicate significance levels: **P < 0.05, ***P < 0.01. The self-reported percentage of successful die rolls is significantly reduced for anodal (D) compared with sham (B) and cathodal (C) tDCS (P = 0.005 and P = 0.018, rank-sum tests; n = 96 and n = 98). The empirical distribution for the cathodal and sham groups is skewed toward higher numbers of successful die rolls compared with the binomial (honest) distribution. The distribution for the anodal group more closely resembles the binomial distribution.
cheating to the more extreme form of cheating in every possible instance. In any case, the results of the cathodal condition clearly show that any general side effects of electrical stimulation, such as possible discomfort or distraction, cannot account for the substantial reduction in cheating observed when stimulation polarity was reversed (20) . We explored possible mechanisms for why anodal tDCS increased honesty. Our task was designed so that participants had to trade off personal financial gain against the value they assigned to being honest. The stimulated neural process could therefore have strengthened honesty by (i) decreasing material self-interest (i.e., the subjective value of money), (ii) enhancing the value placed on honesty, or (iii) perturbing the choice process that trades off these two conflicting motives. We tested these mechanisms using control tasks that were administered to our participants while they were under the influence of the stimulation (SI Appendix).
To assess whether anodal tDCS reduced cheating by weakening material self-interest, we used a dictator game that required participants to split money between themselves and well-known charities. Several studies have documented that participants who behave selfishly in dictator games cheat more in other tasks (12) . This finding is also evident in our data: Selfish behavior in the dictator game (i.e., the amount of money kept) was positively correlated with subjects' earnings from the die-rolling task (Spearman's rho = 0.266, P = 0.001). However, tDCS did not affect the amount of money kept in the dictator game (P = 0.989, Kruskal-Wallis test; Table 1) , and controlling for dictator game behavior in a regression analysis did not change the effect of anodal tDCS on honest reporting (SI Appendix). This result suggests that the increase in honest behavior caused by anodal tDCS is not due to decreased material self-interest.
To test whether anodal tDCS inhibited cheating by increasing the value placed on honesty, we analyzed participants' moral beliefs under the influence of tDCS. Participants indicated the extent to which they considered misreporting in the die-rolling task to be morally inappropriate. This measure was negatively correlated with report rates in the die-rolling task (Spearman's rho = −0.448, P < 0.001), confirming that participants who highly valued honesty cheated less. However, tDCS did not affect this measure of moral values (P = 0.507, Kruskal-Wallis test). We also did not find that tDCS influenced participants' beliefs about the appropriateness of various forms of dishonest behavior in everyday-life situations (P = 0.948, Kruskal-Wallis test).
Moreover, controlling for participants' ratings on these measures in a regression analysis did not alter the effect of anodal tDCS on cheating (SI Appendix). Thus, the reduction in cheating caused by anodal tDCS does not appear to reflect increased moral valuations of honesty.
We next examined whether tDCS stimulation is involved in resolving the trade-off between honesty and material self-gain. If tDCS stimulation were involved, then anodal tDCS should have primarily influenced individuals who were genuinely conflicted between honesty and material gain. As reported earlier, anodal tDCS indeed reduced incomplete cheating but did not alter the rate of complete cheating ( Fig. 1 B and D) . The latter is presumably associated with low conflict due to the complete dominance of financial over moral concerns. We corroborated this result by further examining the magnitude of the tDCS effect in participants who reported low or high moral conflict associated with cheating (Fig. 2) . To this end, we used the median rating (corresponding to the point of indifference on the Likert scale) of how "morally inappropriate" participants considered cheating to be in the die-rolling task, to divide subjects into a low-conflict group and a high-conflict group. For low-conflict participants (n = 42), cheating was not affected by anodal tDCS (P = 0.327, rank-sum test). In contrast, high-conflict subjects (n = 54) cheated significantly less in the anodal tDCS group than in the sham group (P = 0.014, rank-sum test). Remarkably, responses for high-conflict subjects who received anodal tDCS were not statistically different from the 50% honesty benchmark (P = 0.920, t test; n = 30). These findings substantiate that tDCS only affected the trade-off between honesty and material self-interest for participants who were, in fact, conflicted between these two motives.
In light of these findings, the question emerges of whether the stimulated neural process is specialized for resolving conflicts between material self-interest and honesty, or whether it reflects a general-purpose mechanism involved in any choice between conflicting response options (23) . To answer this question, we examined how tDCS affected behavior in three control tasks that required choices between monetary payoffs associated with different levels of risk, ambiguity, and temporal delay, respectively. The stimulation did not affect choices in any of these tasks (columns 4-6 in Table 1 and SI Appendix). Moreover, controlling for participants' behavior in these tasks in a regression analysis did not alter the effect of anodal tDCS on cheating (SI Appendix). Thus, the neural mechanism affected by tDCS does not For subjects who assign a low moral value to honesty (below the median of the group, which corresponds to the point of indifference on the Likert scale), the self-reported percentage of successful die rolls does not significantly differ between anodal tDCS and sham groups (P = 0.327, rank-sum test; n = 42). (B) For subjects who assign a high moral value to honesty (above or equal to the median), the difference in successful die rolls between sham and anodal tDCS groups is statistically significant (P = 0.014, rank-sum test; n = 54). Error bars indicate ±1 SEM. Asterisks indicate significance levels: **P < 0.05. generally appear to affect choices involving financial trade-offs but, rather, specifically resolves conflicts between material selfinterest and the motivation to behave honestly.
A final question we address is whether anodal tDCS over the rDLPFC also reduces cheating when the beneficiary is another person rather than oneself. Testing for such a tDCS effect on prosocial cheating is crucial, because it establishes whether the affected neural mechanism is specific to the conflict between honesty and material self-interest rather than controlling cheating in general (regardless of whether the outcomes benefit oneself or others). This test also addresses potential concerns that anodal tDCS may reduce cheating by biasing participants to opt for a response strategy that is less effortful and complex, because reporting the true or default outcome may be easier than generating false responses to earn money (15) . In our design, self-interested cheating and prosocial cheating are matched for cognitive complexity because both require participants to generate fake responses. To test these accounts, we conducted an additional tDCS experiment with 156 participants [anodal (n = 78) and sham (n = 78)] for which we modified the dierolling task so that subjects could not earn any money for themselves; instead, their earnings were credited to another anonymous participant. All other aspects of the experimental design and procedure were identical to the previous experiment (SI Appendix).
In line with previous findings (12, 29) , participants undergoing sham tDCS cheated even when the associated gains were assigned to an anonymous recipient ( Fig. 3 A and B) . On average, they reported 61% successful outcomes (95% confidence interval: 56-66%), which corresponds to a cheating rate of 22%. A substantial fraction of subjects therefore cheated for purely prosocial reasons, even though the level of cheating was somewhat less pronounced (P = 0.044, rank-sum test) than in the main experiment where cheating served participants' own interest. However, as illustrated in Fig. 3 A and C, anodal tDCS did not reduce prosocial cheating: 62% of the die rolls were reported as successful, which does not significantly differ from the responses under sham tDCS (P = 0.805, rank-sum test). Moreover, the negative effect of anodal tDCS on dishonest reporting was significantly stronger in the main experiment than in the prosocial die-rolling task (P = 0.017, Wald test). The robustness of this difference between the experiments was again clearly confirmed with simulations and Bayesian analyses, which show that the difference in tDCS effects between the two experiments is highly unlikely to result from random fluctuations in the die roll outcomes (SI Appendix). These results show that the tDCS-induced enhancement of honesty in the main experiment cannot be explained by differences in cognitive effort associated with cheating, and they indicate that rDPLFC activity is specifically involved in the resolution of conflicts between honesty and selfinterest, rather than affecting all forms of dishonest behavior.
Our results demonstrate that neural mechanisms involving the rDLPFC play a causal role in modulating honesty when individuals stand to gain from dishonest behavior. These neural processes are functionally independent of other forms of behavioral trade-offs, such as behavioral trade-offs related to risk (24) , ambiguity (25) , or delayed rewards (26, 27) . Such specialization suggests a dedicated neurobiological process that enables humans to resist the self-interested temptation to cheat, consistent with proposals that complex social structures in primate groups have led to the evolution of neural processes dedicated to the control of social behavior (30) . This finding also concurs with recent evidence from twin studies suggesting that moral beliefs about dishonesty are partially inherited (31) .
Although the neural process enhanced by tDCS was clearly functionally specific, it seems unlikely that it operates independently. Previous studies suggest that the targeted DLPFC area may interact with other brain areas related to emotions, such as the amygdala (32) , and brain regions devoted to behavioral control, such as the anterior cingulate and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (19) . The idea that honest behavior may be controlled by an interconnected network of neural processes could be tested in the future by combining neurostimulation with functional neuroimaging measures (33) . Irrespective of these considerations, the current demonstration of a dedicated neurobiological basis for honesty may have important implications for jurisdiction and legal systems, in which the biological limits on the responsibility for legal transgressions are intensely debated (34) . Moreover, our findings of a malleable neural process that influences honesty may be important for the development of measures to promote honesty (13) . However, our finding that tDCS only enhanced honesty in individuals who experienced a conflict when cheating may prevent establishing such measures for the treatment of pathologies coined by an absence of such conflicts (14) .
Materials and Methods
All participants were neurologically and psychiatrically healthy, as ascertained by standardized questionnaires, and did not take any medication at the time of testing. They all gave informed consent, and the procedures received ethical approval from the Ethics Committee of the Canton of Zurich (KEK 2010-0326/3). A total of 145 university students participated in the main study. They were invited to group sessions with 10-12 participants each. In each session, participants were randomly assigned to one of three stimulation groups [anodal (n = 49), cathodal (n = 49), and sham (n = 47) tDCS]. Neither the participants nor the experimenters knew who would receive active or sham stimulation.
The tDCS was applied by means of a multichannel stimulator (NeuroConn) and pairs of standard sponge electrodes soaked in saline solution. One of these electrodes (5 cm × 7 cm) was placed based on frameless stereotaxy over the rDLPFC region of interest found active during honest reporting in a previous fMRI study (19) . The other electrode (10 cm × 10 cm) was placed over the vertex. tDCS was applied at an intensity of 1.5 mA for 30 min (in the anodal and cathodal groups) or was switched off after 60 s (in the sham group) to mimic the tingling sensations at the start of the stimulation (20) . To minimize the sensations at stimulation onset, the current was linearly ramped up (at the start) and down (at the end) over periods of 20 s.
During tDCS, participants completed a series of experimental tasks, the order of which was counterbalanced across sessions. Honest behavior was assessed with a game of chance requiring subjects to roll a six-sided die 10 times and report the outcomes of the die rolls. In each round, half of the rolled numbers resulted in a payoff of 9 Swiss francs, whereas the remaining numbers yielded no payoff. The payoff scheme for each round was displayed on a computer screen that participants also used to enter the outcome of their roll and the associated payoff. Because participants were fully shielded from view, no one (including the experimenters) could detect whether individual subjects misreported the outcomes of their die rolls. However, it is possible to detect cheating at the group level by comparing the mean percentage of successful die rolls reported by the subjects with the 50% benchmark if everyone reported honestly (35) . The other experimental measures acquired in each session included a dictator game to measure selfish behavior, an investment task to measure preferences for risky and ambiguous outcomes, and a delay discounting task to measure impulsivity. These additional tasks helped to disguise the purpose of the experiment by reducing the prominence of the die-rolling task, and they allowed us to control for other aspects of choice behavior that may be affected by the stimulation (24, 26, 27, 36) . After stimulation was switched off [but while participants were still under the lasting influence of physiological tDCS aftereffects (20, 37)], we collected various questionnaire measures of our participants' beliefs about the tasks and their everyday behavior. At the end of the experiment, the computer randomly selected one of the four experimental tasks and the resulting individual choice-dependent payoffs were paid to the participants.
We also conducted a prosocial cheating experiment with an additional 156 participants [anodal (n = 78) and sham (n = 78)] for which we modified the die-rolling task so that subjects could not earn any money for themselves; instead, their earnings were credited to another anonymous participant. All other aspects of the experimental design and procedure were identical to the main experiment.
The honesty data were analyzed by means of comprehensive regression analyses that controlled for potential group differences in various participant-related measures and potential tDCS effects on the control tasks. These analyses were complemented by direct group comparisons focusing on specific aspects of the honesty data. Moreover, numerical simulations and Bayesian analyses were used to ascertain that our findings are highly unlikely to reflect purely random variations in the outcomes of our specific sample. A detailed description of the sample, experimental procedures, and statistical analyses is given in SI Appendix (21).
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All testing took place in the group testing room of the Laboratory for Social and Neural Systems Research (SNS-Lab) at the University Hospital Zurich. This room contains 14 identical, interconnected computer workstations that are shielded from sight, thereby allowing parallel and anonymous testing of multiple participants. Testing was always conducted in groups of 10 to 12 participants unless some participants did not show up. Participants in each session were randomly sorted into the different tDCS groups (see below) so that all groups were tested in parallel, thereby avoiding confounds due to session, experimenter, and time-of-day effects present in serial testing regimes. The participants were recruited with the software "h-root" (1) and the experiments were conducted using the software z-Tree (2). On average, experimental sessions lasted about 1.5 hours and participants earned about 80 Swiss francs (approximately 82 US dollars at the time of testing). All testing was conducted with 4 experimenters. Two experimenters instructed the participants and mounted the transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) electrodes, one experimenter localized the target sites for tDCS, and one experimenter handled all software controlling the experimental tasks and tDCS.
Main experiment

Participants
We determined our sample size using simulations and power calculations. We chose a target sample size of 50 subjects per tDCS condition in both studies so that we could detect effects of medium size (Cohen's d ~ 0.5) with 5% statistical significance and 80% power. Because the data-generating process follows a binomial distribution in the die-rolling task, we were able to run simulations to compute statistical power for this measure. Specifically, we simulated 10,000 Sham samples (with 50 subjects per sample) assuming a die success rate of 65% (this corresponds to the midpoint of success rates that were observed in previous experiments (3, 4, 5) . In addition, we simulated 10,000 anodal samples (with 50 subjects per sample) assuming various die success rates ranging in steps of 0.5% from 55% to 57.5%. For each simulated pair of anodal and sham samples, we used rank-sum tests to assess whether the difference in successful die rolls is statistically significant. The fractions of hypotheses that were rejected on a 5% significance level provide us with estimates of the statistical power for the different effect sizes. The results of the simulation show that a sample of 50 subjects per treatment is sufficient to detect treatment effects that are even below medium-size (i.e., Cohen's d ~ 0.4 or larger, respectively 9% difference in die success rate) with 81% power. For the control task we conducted a standard power analysis using the software Stata 14. The power analysis shows that we can detect medium sized effects (Cohens's d = 0.566) with 80% power and 5% statistical significance (see Table  S1 ).
We recruited university students from the Zurich area as participants. Due to attrition, the final sample for the main experiment was 145 subjects (72 females, mean age 23+/-4, all right-handed). Since Cathodal tDCS did not have any effects in the main study, we chose to enhance statistical power by focusing on the comparison between anodal and sham tDCS for the pro-social cheating experiment (the target number of subjects per conditions was thus 75). In this experiment, we encountered less attrition than expected, resulting in a final sample of 156 subjects (88 females, 78 per tDCS group, mean age 23+/-3, all right-handed). All participants were neurologically and psychiatrically healthy, as ascertained by standardized questionnaires, and did not take any medication at the time of testing. They all gave informed consent and the procedures received ethical approval from the Ethics committee of the Canton of Zurich.
Transcranical direct current stimulation (tDCS)
In each session, participants were randomly assigned in equal numbers to the tDCS conditions (anodal, cathodal, and sham in the main experiment and anodal and sham in the follow-up experiment). The participants in all these conditions were simultaneously stimulated using a multi-channel stimulator (see below) during the experimental tasks. Neither the participants nor the three experimenters interacting with the participants knew which seats were given active or sham stimulation, ensuring that stimulation was administered in a double-blind fashion.
We applied bipolar tDCS by means of a commercially available, CE-certified multichannel stimulator (NeuroConn, Ilmenau, Germany). This device allows simultaneous stimulation of up to 16 participants with individually-tailored electric currents applied via electrodes mounted on the scalp. tDCS does not directly elicit action potentials, but depending on electrode polarity (i.e., under the anode or the cathode), the applied currents have been shown to either increase or decrease neural excitability, respectively (6, 7) . Thus, tDCS is commonly used in cognitive neuroscience studies as a neuromodulator that facilitates or impairs activity elicited by an experimental task (6) . We applied this wellestablished approach and targeted the rDLPFC region that was activated in the study by Greene and Paxton (8) when participants successfully resisted the temptation to cheat (see their Fig. S1B and Table S2 ). We applied either anodal tDCS to enhance this activity, cathodal tDCS to weaken this activity, or sham tDCS to control for unspecific stimulation effects. These stimulation protocols were applied in a between subject-design (i.e., three separate groups), as tDCS has long-lasting after-effects (6, 9) that make it difficult to interleave different stimulation protocols within a given session. Moreover, the betweensubject design prevented memory or order effects on responding.
tDCS was applied by pairs of standard sponge electrodes soaked in saline solution. One of these electrodes (5cm x 7cm) was placed over the rDLPFC region of interest. The other electrode (10cm x 10cm) was placed over the vertex, based on successful stimulation achieved with this electrode montage in previous studies (10, 11) . The vertex electrode was chosen to be considerably larger so as to minimize current density and thereby neural stimulation under this electrode (12) . tDCS was applied at an intensity of 1.5 mA for 30 minutes (in the anodal and cathodal group). Thus, the intensity and duration of simulation was somewhat higher than in other studies using similar electrode montages as here (12); however, it is still highly unlikely that these changes in parameters led to functionally relevant stimulation effects under the large return electrode. In the sham group, the stimulation was switched off after 60 seconds; this mimics the tingling sensations at the start of the stimulation but does not provide neurally effective stimulation effects (6) . To minimize the sensations at stimulation onset, the current was linearly ramped up (at the start) and down (at the end) over periods of 20 seconds.
To identify the correct scalp sites for electrode placement, we first recruited 43 participants for whom we had already acquired an anatomical MR image (using a Philips Achieva 3T Scanner and a T1-weighted MP-Rage sequence). We then localized in these brain images the site corresponding to the activity related to honest reporting in Greene and Paxton (8; MNI coordinate x,y,z = -26,-53,18) as well as the vertex identified by the dorsal confluence of the two principal sulci. For each participant, we determined the scalp coordinates overlying these cortical targets by means of Brainsight 2.0 frameless stereotaxy (Rogue research, Montreal, Canada). We marked for each participant the precise location of these scalp locations in the space of standard EEG 128 surface electrodes caps (Waveguard-Duke cap system, Cephalon A/S, Noerresundby, Denmark, provided by Advanced Neuro Technology, ANT: www.ant-neuro.com). This measurement revealed that the stimulation point on all participants' skulls was localized in an area of 6 cm 2 (see Fig. S1 ), delimited on the cap by the electrodes RR4-33 (Top-Left), RR3-67 (Top-Right), RA1-63 (BottomLeft), and RB1-38 (Bottom-Right), superimposing the rDLPFC. For all remaining participants without a T1-weighted structural MRI scan, we therefore localized the center point of the tDCS electrode to lie in the center of these 4 standardized EEG electrode positions as determined by the Waveguard-Duke cap system.
Experimental tasks and procedures
Pre-stimulation phase
After a brief welcome instruction, participants were allocated to seats in the lab by handing out randomly shuffled cards with seat numbers (see Fig. S2 for a schematic timeline of the experiment). While waiting to be called one-by-one to a separate room for stimulation site localization, participants filled out a questionnaire comprising some basic demographic questions (e.g., age, gender, and income) and the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) (13) .
The latter is a simple measure of cognitive skills that takes only a few minutes and is highly correlated with more elaborate measures of cognitive skills, such as the Scholastic Achievement Test (SAT) or the American College Test (ACT). Once all subjects were connected to the tDCS electrodes, we assessed their current state of mood, alertness, and calmness using the multidimensional mood questionnaire (MDBF) (14) .
Stimulation phase
The main experiment started with the tDCS stimulation (see section "1.1.2. Transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS)"). Because the neurophysiological effects of tDCS may take some time to reach stable equilibrium (7), the main experimental tasks (see below) began 3 minutes after the start of the tDCS stimulation. During this time, subjects first answered some questions about their subjective well-being and life satisfaction. Thereafter, subjects were informed via computerized instructions that they would perform four independent tasks for which they could earn money. They were also informed that only one task, selected at random by the computer at the end of the experiment, would be paid out for real. Paying for one randomly selected task eliminated the possibility for subjects to hedge their income risks across tasks. We randomized the order of the tasks to control for potential spill-over effects. Moreover, as each session involved all tDCS conditions, the stimulation was fully orthogonal to the order of the tasks. The subjects performed the tasks in full privacy as the research assistants had left the experimental room. If subjects had questions or needed help, they could press a computer key that sent an alarm signal to the research assistants in an adjacent room.
During the tDCS stimulation, subjects performed a die-rolling task to measure cheating and three additional experimental control tasks:
1) a dictator game to measure selfish behavior, 2) an investment task to measure preferences for risky and ambiguous outcomes, and 3) a delay discounting task to measure impulsivity.
Our task of main interest is the die-rolling task. The other three tasks are auxiliary tasks that served two purposes: First, they allowed us to measure and control for other aspects of choice behavior that may be affected by the stimulation (15, 16, 17, 10) . Second, they helped to disguise the purpose of the experiment by reducing the prominence of the dierolling task.
Die-rolling task: The rules of this task required subjects to roll a six-sided die ten times and to report the outcomes of the die rolls. In each round, half of the rolled numbers resulted in a payoff of 9 Swiss francs whereas the remaining numbers yielded no payoff. Prior to each roll, a computer screen displayed which numbers would yield the monetary payoff in that round; the winning numbers changed from round to round. In this task participants faced a real financial incentive to break the rules by misreporting the outcomes of unsuccessful die rolls. Subjects used a cup to roll the die and check the outcomes. They had to report both the outcomes of the die rolls as well as the associated payoffs in order to make sure that everyone understood the consequences of their actions. Because subjects were fully shielded from sight, there was no way anyone (including the experimenters) could detect whether individual subjects misreported the outcomes of their die rolls. However, it is possible to detect cheating at the group level by comparing the mean percentage of successful die rolls reported by the subjects with the 50% benchmark if everyone reported honestly. If we assume that none of the subjects cheated for his or her disadvantage (i.e., by reporting that an outcome is not successful when in fact it is) * , we are able to calculate cheating rates at the group level (4). Let m be the percentage of misreported rolls. The percentage of outcomes reported as successful p is thus determined by:
If subjects cheat in a given round, they report a successful die roll outcome with probability 1. However, if they report honestly, they report a successful outcome only with probability 0.5. We can thus characterize the percentage of misreported die rolls by:
If the random computer draw at the end of the experiment determined that the die-rolling task was selected for payment, we paid out the earnings from all 10 rounds.
Dictator game: In this task subjects could donate money to three well-known charities: the Swiss Red Cross (SRC), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF). For each charity, subjects were endowed with 60 Swiss francs and decided how much of this sum to donate to the respective charity. We use the average amount kept as a measure of the subjects' selfishness. The use of three charities reduces the influence of mismatch between what subjects consider a good cause and the charities' missions (but note that the main results are robust if we use the decision for each charity separately; see section "3.3. Robustness checks III: Disaggregated behavioral measures").
* To the best of our knowledge, the study by Utikal and Fischbacher (18) is the only report of evidence for disadvantageous cheating. However, that study is based on a rather unusual subject pool of nuns and involves data from only 12 die rolls in total (i.e., 1 roll per nun). The law of large numbers may not apply to such a small sample. A recent meta-study, covering 72 experiments, suggests that it is extremely rare that subjects earn less than what is implied by truthful reporting (see Fig. 1 in (19) ).
If the dictator game was selected for payment, we paid out one of the three donation decisions, as determined randomly by the computer at the end of the experiment.
Investment task:
In this task, subjects made two investment decisions (20, 21) . In both cases, subjects were endowed with 45 Swiss francs and decided how much to invest in a risky lottery. They could keep the remaining amount. For the first investment choice (the "ambiguity task"), subjects had imperfect information about the success probability of the lottery. They were shown a picture of a plastic box filled with blue, red, and yellow balls in unknown proportion and were told that the computer will draw one ball at random. If the drawn ball was yellow, they won two and a half times their invested amount; for the two other colors, they lost their invested amount. We set the share of yellow, winning balls to 50 percent (unbeknownst to the subjects). For the second investment choice (the "risk task"), the success probability was again 50 percent, but this time subjects knew the success probability. They were told that the computer would draw a random number between 1 and 100; if the chosen number was between 51 and 100, subjects won two and a half times their invested amount, for all other numbers, they lost their investment. The investment amount in the ambiguity task provides us with a measure of subjects' willingness to take risks under ambiguity, which is an inherent feature in most real-life situations that involve risk. By contrast, the investment amount in the risk task measures subjects' risk aversion in the absence of ambiguity. The ambiguity task preceded the risk task to prevent that subjects would use the success probability in the risk task as a benchmark for estimating the success probability in the ambiguity task. If the investment task was chosen for payment, one of the two investment decisions became payoff relevant, which was randomly determined by the computer at the end of the experiment.
Delay discounting task:
In this task, subjects made a series of binary choices between receiving 60 Swiss francs at a later date and obtaining an equal or smaller amounts of money at an earlier date (22) . We implemented three scenarios: (i) "today vs. in 3 months", (ii) "today vs. in 6 months", and (iii) "in 3 months vs. in 6 months." For each scenario, subjects were given a list with 20 choice situations between the delayed payment and some earlier payment. In the first row, the amount of the earlier payment was equal to the amount of the delayed payment (i.e., 60 Swiss francs). For every subsequent row, the amount of the earlier payment decreased by 3 Swiss francs. Thus, the sooner subjects switch to the later payment when going through the list, the more patient they are. We used the subjects' average switching point from the earlier to the delayed payment in all three scenarios as a measure of their impulsivity; however, the results remain robust if we use the switching points of the individual scenarios or a measure of present bias instead (see section "3.3. Robustness checks III: Disaggregated behavioral measures"). If the delay discounting task was chosen for payment, the computer randomly selected one row within a scenario. If subjects chose a payment that was due "today" in that row, they received the money immediately after the testing. If subjects chose the delayed payment (i.e., in 3 months or in 6 months) instead, they could choose between receiving the amount by mail or they could pick it up in person.
Following the four experimental tasks, we again assessed subjects' current state of mood, alertness, and calmness using the MDBF mood questionnaire. This allows us to capture potential changes in mood over the course of the experiment. The mood questionnaire has two versions. We counterbalanced across subjects which version was completed before and after the stimulation.
Post-stimulation phase
After switching off tDCS, the experiment continued with a final questionnaire. tDCS produces long-lasting physiological after-effects (6, 9), so participants completed the questionnaire while they were still under the influence of tDCS. We first asked participants whether they believed tDCS had an influence on their behavior. We further asked subjects to rate the comprehensibility of the instructions for each of the four experimental tasks. We also assessed subjects' moral valuation of honesty in the context of the die-rolling task, by asking them to indicate the extent to which they agree with the statement "Cheating in the die-rolling task is morally inappropriate" on a 7-point scale ranging from "I do not agree at all" (= 0) to "I totally agree" (= 6). Subjects subsequently answered five questions related to civic honesty as used in the World Values Survey (23). More specifically, participants had to indicate the extent to which they find certain forms of dishonest behavior in everyday life situations justifiable, such as "Claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled to" or "Avoiding a fare on the public transport", on a 7-point scale ranging from "Never justifiable" (= 0) to "Always justifiable" (= 6). The last part of the survey included a Machiavellianism scale (Mach-IV) (24) , which serves as a personality measure of opportunism, status seeking, and lack of morality.
At the end of the experiment the computer randomly selected one of the four experimental tasks for each subject to be paid out. Payoffs were calculated accordingly and paid to the subjects before they left the lab. Table S2 reports descriptive statistics of the participants from the main experiment. The three experimental groups (i.e., anodal, cathodal, and sham) are well balanced with regard to participants' socio-economic background, cognitive ability, and personality. None of the variables we collected differs statistically between groups at the 5-percent significance level, which suggests that the randomization was successful. We nevertheless control for these variables in the regression analysis.
Pro-social cheating experiment
After the main experiment, we conducted a pro-social cheating experiment in which subjects could not earn any money for themselves in the die-rolling task; instead their earnings from the die rolls were credited to another anonymous participant. All other aspects of the die-rolling task were identical to the main experiment.
The goal of the pro-social cheating experiment was to test whether anodal tDCS over the rDLPFC increases honesty when the financial gains from dishonesty do not serve individuals' self-interest. This allowed us to examine whether the stimulated neural process has a specific function to resolve conflicts between honesty and self-interest or whether it is involved in regulating cheating per se (i.e., independent of the underlying motives). This test also addresses potential concerns that anodal tDCS may reduce cheating by biasing participants to opt for a response strategy that is less effortful and complex, as reporting the true or default outcome may be easier than generating false responses to earn money (25) . In our design, self-interested and pro-social cheating are matched for cognitive complexity, as both require participants to generate fake responses.
A total of 156 new subjects were recruited for this experiment and were randomly assigned to anodal and sham tDCS (n = 78 each in anodal and sham). All administered procedures and other experimental tasks (including the questionnaires) were identical with those used for the main experiment. Table S3 provides an overview of the sample characteristics from the pro-social cheating experiment. The two experimental groups (i.e., anodal and sham) are well-balanced in terms of participants' socio-economic background, cognitive ability, and personality. None of the acquired variables differs statistically between groups at the 5-percent significance level, suggesting that the randomization was successful. We nevertheless control for these variables in the regression analysis.
Statistical analysis
All reported p-values in the manuscript and supplementary materials are from two-sided tests. Table S4 presents Probit regression results from the main experiment. We estimate the following regression model:
Regression analysis of the main experiment
Pr successful outcome :; = 1 = Φ(α + β * Anodal : + γ * Cathodal : + δ * : + ϵ :; ).
The decision of individual to report a successful outcome for die roll is regressed on indicators for the anodal and cathodal tDCS condition and a set of control variables : . The estimation results remain qualitatively the same if we alternatively estimate a linear probability model using ordinary least squares (OLS).
Column (a) of Table S4 reports the regression results without the control variables. In comparison with treatment sham, anodal tDCS significantly reduced the probability of reporting a successful die roll by 10.6 percentage points (p = 0.007, Wald test). By contrast, the coefficient for cathodal tDCS is close to zero and statistically insignificant (p = 0.737, Wald test). The test results reported at the bottom of column (a) in Table S4 highlights that the coefficient estimates for anodal and cathodal tDCS are significantly different from each other (p = 0.021, Wald test). In column (b), we additionally include a rich set of control variables: age, gender, relationship status, Swiss nationality, monthly amount of cash available, cognitive skills, machiavellism, major of studies, and baseline mood, wakefulness, and calmness. The results remain practically unchanged in comparison to the unconditional regression model.
In column (c) we extend the unconditional model by including a measure of selfishness (i.e., the average amount kept in the three dictator decisions). The results reveal that selfishness is indeed positively correlated with the probability of reporting a successful die roll (p < 0.001, Wald test). However, the coefficient estimate for anodal tDCS remains largely unchanged, suggesting that anodal tDCS did not increase honesty by weakening material self-interest.
Column (d) includes control variables for participants' task-specific valuation of honesty and their perception of civic honesty norms (i.e., their beliefs about the inappropriateness of various forms of dishonest behavior in everyday life situations) (21) . While participants who consider misreporting in the die-rolling task to be morally inappropriate were significantly less likely to report a successful outcome (p < 0.001, Wald test), controlling for their beliefs about the inappropriateness of dishonesty in everyday life did not have any additional explanatory power (p = 0.618, Wald test). The stimulation-induced increase in honest behavior is independent of moral beliefs, as indicated by the relatively stable coefficient of anodal tDCS.
We further estimated a model where we control for measures of general conflict-related behavioral control (i.e., investments in the ambiguity and risk task as well as impulsivity in the delay discounting task). Column (e) shows that none of the three measures are significantly related to subjects' behavior in the die-rolling task (p = 0.614, p = 0.841, respectively p = 0.905, Wald tests) and the inclusion of these measures as control variables in the regression model leaves the impact of anodal tDCS unchanged. Finally, column (f)
shows that the effect of anodal tDCS does not change if we include the full set of control variables simultaneously.
Finally, we assessed the robustness of the regression results and used the number of reported successes as dependent variable rather than the binary indicator for each separate die roll. Table S5 illustrates that the results remain unchanged if we use the alternative dependent variable.
Simulations and Bayesian analysis of the main experiment
The observed die roll outcomes in the different groups are subject to random variations even if subjects reported fully honestly. One important question is therefore whether the law of large numbers applies to our sample size, so that the deviations from the 50% success rate benchmark and the observed tDCS effects are not simply due to random fluctuations in the outcomes. To answer this question, we simulated 100,000 experiments with the same number of participants and die rolls as in our original study, assuming that each die roll is generated by a binomial process with an underlying success rate of 50% (i.e., truthful reporting). Panels A, B and C in Fig. S3 show that, given our sample size and results, it is extremely unlikely that subjects in the three tDCS groups reported completely honestly. The empirically observed die success rates (indicated by the red vertical lines) lie outside of (for cathodal and sham) or at the very edge (for anodal) of the simulated distribution of success probabilities. In other words, if all subjects reported truthfully, then the probability of observing the same or larger percentages of successful die rolls as in our experiment are p = 0 (for sham and cathodal tDCS) and p = 0.00047 (for anodal tDCS). Most importantly, the probability that participants behaved honestly and nevertheless generated the observed difference in die success rates between anodal and sham tDCS is p = 0.00051 (see Panel D in Fig. S3 ). Hence, only 5 out of 10,000 experiments with a similarly-sized sample of completely honest participants would show a tDCS effect of similar or larger size than the effect we observe. We also ran additional simulations assuming that subjects in both tDCS groups may have cheated incompletely and may have reported successful die rolls with a rate of 65% or 80% (see Panel D in Fig. S3 ). Under these assumptions, the probabilities of observing equal or larger tDCS effects than in our experiment are p = 0.00023 (assuming a success rate of 65%) and p = 0.00002 (assuming a success rate of 80%), respectively.
We complement the simulation analysis with a Bayesian analysis that calculates the posterior probability distribution across all possible die roll success rates that may have generated the observed pattern of responses. For this analysis, we did not have to assume that participants told the truth but could rather estimate the probability for all possible cheating rates given our observed data. We modeled the die rolls in the three treatment groups as three independent binomial processes with their own success rates. To be maximally conservative in our assumptions, we initialized the model with completely flat priors, so that any percentage from 0% to 100% would be considered equally likely for the success rate of the die rolls in the three tDCS groups (note that the literature would suggest realistic values for these success rates to be between 50% and 80% to capture the tendency for incomplete cheating; the use of such realistic priors would strengthen our argument even more). We then estimated the posterior probability distributions over possible die roll success rates and group differences using the Gibbs sampler implemented in the MultiChain Monte-Carlo (MCMC) approach in JAGS (26) . A total of 75,000 samples were drawn from an initial burn-in step and subsequently a total of new 75,000 samples were drawn with three chains (each chain was derived based on a different random number generator engine, and each with a different seed). We applied a thinning of 5 to this final sample, thus resulting in a final set of 15,000 samples for each parameter probability distribution. Fig. S3 below shows these distributions. After observing our specific dataset, the probability that the participants cheated (i.e., that the success rate underlying their reported rolls was greater than 50%) is at least p = 0.999999995. Perhaps more importantly, the probability the participants in the anodal group cheated less than participants in the sham group (i.e., that the difference in die roll success rates is negative) is 0.9995. The most probable effect of tDCS on honesty given our specific dataset (median of the posterior) is a decrease of the die roll success rate by 11%, and there is a probability of p = 0.95 that anodal tDCS reduced the die success rate by more than 5%.
In sum, the simulation exercise and the Bayesian analysis both underline that the law of large numbers applies to our specific sample size and that our results do not reflect random fluctuations in the die rolls. Instead, the observed data provide strong evidence that anodal tDCS substantially decreased the systematic cheating that was evident in the sham tDCS condition.
Comparing selfish and pro-social cheating
In column (a) of Table S6 , we perform a difference-in-differences regression analysis to compare the effect of anodal tDCS in the main (selfish cheating) experiment (n = 145) and the pro-social cheating experiment (n = 156). We pool the data from the two experiments and estimate a Probit model in which we include an interaction term between the anodal tDCS condition and a dummy for the main experiment measuring self-interested cheating. The coefficient of anodal tDCS thus captures the tDCS effect in the pro-social cheating experiment, while the interaction term shows whether and to what extent the tDCS effect differs from the self-interested cheating experiment. We include the same set of control variables used in column (b) of Table S4 .
The coefficient of anodal tDCS is close to zero and statistically insignificant (p = 0.757, Wald test), meaning that anodal tDCS did not influence the responses in the pro-social cheating task. This finding contrasts with the tDCS effect found in the self-interested cheating experiment, as confirmed by the significant negative interaction effect in columns (a) and (b) of Table S6 (p = 0.022, respectively p = 0.017, Wald tests). We also assessed the robustness of the regression results and used the number of reported successes as dependent variable rather than the binary indicator for each separate die roll. Table S7 illustrates that the results remain unchanged if we use the alternative dependent variable.
Additional simulations and Bayesian analysis confirm that the larger tDCS effect in the main experiment (compared to the prosocial-cheating experiment) does not simply reflect purely random fluctuations in the die roll outcomes. We simulated an additional 100,000 possible experimental outcomes for the pro-social cheating experiment with the same sample size and number of die rolls as in the real experiment, assuming different levels of (dis)honest reporting (die roll success rates of 50%, 65%, and 80%). Subsequently, we contrasted the differences between anodal and sham for the main and the pro-social cheating experiment in the simulated samples (see Panel A Fig. S4 ). The probabilities that random fluctuations in die roll outcomes generate the same or a larger difference in tDCS effects between experiments than we observe are p = 0.0019 (assuming a success rate of 50% in all tDCS groups), p = 0.00155 (assuming a success rate of 65% in all tDCS groups), and p = 0.00014 (assuming a success rate of 80% in all tDCS groups). In the Bayesian analysis, we again assumed that the die rolls in the four groups of interest (anodal and sham tDCS in the two experiments) were generated by independent binomial processes with their own independent success rates. The priors for these rates were again initialized as uniform distribution between 0% and 100% and the posterior distributions given the observed data were estimated with the same MCMC procedures as for the main experiment. This revealed a posterior probability that the tDCS effect is larger for self-interested than prosocial cheating of p = 0.9981, and the most probable size of this interaction effect is 12% (median of the posterior, 95% CI: 4%-20%, see Fig. S4 ).
All these analyses therefore show that the stimulated neural process is specifically involved in the resolution of conflicts between honesty and self-interest rather than in an inhibition of cheating per se. Moreover, due to the fact that the self-interested and pro-social cheating experiments were equivalent in terms of choice formats and cognitive complexity, these results also establish that the tDCS-induced enhancement of honesty in the self-interested cheating experiment cannot be explained by changes in cognitive effort cost or demands imposed by the cognitive complexity of cheating.
Robustness checks
Robustness checks I: Perception of tDCS and affective state
We examined whether the three tDCS conditions were perceived in a similar fashion by the subjects. Towards the end of the experiment, subjects were asked whether they thought the brain stimulation with tDCS influenced their behavior. Responses to this question did not significantly differ between treatments (χ 2 = 2.225, p = 0.329; χ 2 test), confirming the double-blind nature of the stimulation. Moreover, the regression results reported in columns (a) and (b) of Table S8 show that including how subjects perceived the stimulation does not alter the effect of anodal tDCS on behavior in the die-rolling task.
To rule out that tDCS may have changed behavior indirectly, by means of altering participants' general affective state, we additionally tested for nonspecific effects of tDCS on subjects' mood, wakefulness, and calmness, by administering a validated questionnaire (MDBF) (14) we additionally controlled for changes in mood, wakefulness, and calmness and found that the main tDCS effect remains robust (see columns c and d of Table S8 ).
Robustness checks II: Cognitive complexity
Anodal tDCS could have reduced cheating by biasing subjects to opt for a cognitively less complex response strategy (as reporting the true or default outcome may be easier than generating a false response). However, as we argue in the main text, the selfish and the pro-social cheating experiments are fully matched in terms of cognitive complexity because both required similarly strategic generation of fake responses in identical experimental contexts (except for the difference in who would benefit from a possible win). If cognitive complexity was responsible for our results, then we should have observed similar effects of anodal tDCS in both experiments. This is clearly refuted by the data.
We nevertheless conducted two further robustness checks to address the issue of cognitive complexity. First, we assessed whether tDCS influenced subjects' understanding of the dierolling task. At the end of the experiment, we asked subjects to indicate how much they agreed with the statement "the instructions of the die-rolling task were comprehensible" on a scale from "I do not agree at all" (= 0) to "I totally agree" (= 6). The average score was above 5.7 in all three treatments and did not differ between the tDCS conditions (χ M = 1.114, p = 0.573; Kruskal-Wallis tests). Moreover, the regression analysis in column (b) of Table S9 shows that comprehension of the instructions neither correlates with response behavior in the die-rolling task (p = 0.764, Wald test) nor changes the impact of anodal tDCS on cheating. Second, we tested whether cognitive skills are related to behavior in the die-rolling task. The questionnaire from the pre-stimulation phase included the Cognitive Reflection Test (13), a validated measure of cognitive skills. The results reported in column (c) of Table S9 highlight that cognitive skills do not significantly predict behavior in the die-rolling task (p = 0.132, Wald test). Additional regression results (not reported in detail) indicate that the interaction effects between cognitive skills and the anodal (or cathodal) tDCS conditions are insignificant (p = 0.216, respectively p = 0.439, Wald test). In sum, we find no indication that cognitive complexity underlies the effect of anodal tDCS on honest reporting.
Robustness checks III: Disaggregated behavioral measures
In our main analysis, we used the average amount kept from three dictator decisions as a measure of selfish behavior. The Cronbach's alpha for the three decisions is 0.926, suggesting high internal consistency. In Table S10 , we show that tDCS did not have any influence on each of the dictator decisions separately.
Furthermore, in the main analysis we use the average of the switching points elicited in the three delay discounting scenarios (i.e., "today vs. in 3 months", "today vs. in 6 months" and "in 3 months vs. in 6 months") as a measure of impulsivity. Table S8 shows that there is no significant tDCS influence for any of three measures. Moreover, we also constructed a measure of present bias, by taking the difference in switching points between "today vs. in 3 months" and "in 3 months vs. in 6 months". tDCS did not significantly affect this alternative measure of impulsivity either, as shown in the last column of Table S11 .
Robustness checks V: Effects on control task in pooled sample
We used exactly the same design for the control tasks in the main and pro-social cheating experiment. This allows us to pool the data and increase statistical power when assessing the impact of anodal tDCS on behavior in the control tasks. In total, the pooled sample consists of 252 subjects that were either assigned to sham (n=125) or anodal tDCS (n=127). Table S12 shows that all treatment differences are small (with Cohen's d ranging from 0.032 to 0.193, which is 3-17 times smaller than the size of the tDCS effect on honesty) and that none of them reaches statistical significance at the 5% level. The difference between tDCS groups in the ambiguity task is marginally significant (p=0.067, rank-sum test) but the sign is inconsistent with an effect that could account for the reduction of selfish cheating for anodal tDCS (i.e., there was a small increase in risk-taking during anodal tDCS, but this would be expected to decrease rather than increase honesty if there was a link between these two domains in our experimental context).
Experimental instructions
Instructions for the main experiment
Below are the instructions for the four experimental tasks from the main experiment. We randomized the order of the tasks at the session level. Subjects were informed that only one of the four tasks was paid out which was randomly determined by the computer at the end of the experiment. We used the term "tokens" to refer to the experimental currency (exchange rate: 100 tokens = 30 Swiss francs).
Task A: Die-rolling task
This part consists of 10 rounds. In each round you can earn up to 30 tokens. The profits from each round will be added up.
In each round, you will be asked to roll a die and report the outcome of the die roll. Use the die and cup in front of you. The die number you report determines your payoff in that round. You can check how much you earn in the payoff table at the bottom of the screen.
Example for the table below: If you roll a 3, your income increases by 0 tokens. If you roll a 4, your income increases by 30 tokens etc.
Payment:
If task A is selected for payment, you will receive the total profit from all 10 rounds.
Please click the OK button to start the task. This screen was shown for all 10 die rolls.
Please complete this task now using the cup at your table.
You can roll the die several rounds to check that it is a fair die. Always remember the first outcome because this is the one that counts. Click the OK button once you have rolled the die.
Please enter now the outcome of the die roll (the first die number you have rolled) and the corresponding payoff.
Number rolled Payoff
Task B: Donation task
In this task you have the opportunity to donate money to three charitable organizations (Swiss Red Cross, UNICEF Switzerland, and Médecins sans Frontières).
For each charity, you get an endowment of 200 tokens. You will have to decide how many tokens you want to donate to each of the three charities. You can keep the remaining amount, i.e., the 200 tokens minus the donation.
If task B is selected for payment, one of your three donations decisions (B1, B2, or B3) will be chosen at random for payment. You can request a copy of the receipts for the overall donation amounts.
Click the continue button if you are ready. 
This screen was shown for all three donation decisions.
Task C: Investment task
In this task you will make two investment decisions (C1 and C2) for which you can earn money.
If task C is selected for payment, one of your two investment decisions (C1 or C2) will be chosen at random for payment. The computer will randomly draw one ball out of a box filled with many red, blue, and yellow balls in unknown ratio (see picture below).
• If a red or blue ball is drawn, you will lose your investment and you will not get any money back.
• If a yellow ball is drawn, you win 2.5 times the amount you have invested.
Please note that the proportion of red, blue, and yellow balls is identical to the picture below.
Your payoff is calculated as follows: This lottery is different than the previous one. The computer will randomly draw a number between 1 and 100 (each number has the same probability of being drawn).
• If the random number is between 1 and 50, you will lose your investment and you will not get any money back.
• If the random number is between 51 and 100, you win 2.5 times the amount you have invested.
Your payoff is calculated as follows:
• If you lose (random number is between 1 and 50): Your payoff = 150 tokensinvestment • If you win (random number is between 51 and 100): Your payoff = 150 tokensinvestment + (2.5x investment)
Task D: "Sooner vs. later" task
In this task you will have to choose whether to receive a certain amount at an earlier point in time, or whether you prefer to wait in order to get a larger amount at a later time. You will see different decision situations on the screen. For example, "Do you prefer 100 tokens today or 200 tokens in 3 months?" You will have to decide which option you like better.
You will make your decisions based on a total of three choice tables (D1, D2, and D3). In each row, you will see two options, A and B. You can choose between
• option B, a fixed amount of 200 tokens you will get at a later point in time (for example, "in 3 months"), • or option A, a smaller amount of tokens that will be paid out at an earlier point in time (for example, "today").
If task D is selected for payment, one row from one of the three choice tables will be chosen at random for payment. If you chose the sooner option in that row, you will be paid the according amount at the sooner date. If you chose the later option, you will receive the equivalent of 200 tokens at the later date. If the payment date is "today," you will receive the amount immediately after finishing the study. If the payment date is "in 3 months" or "in 6 months" we will send you the money per mail or you can pick it up at the lab.
Click the continue button if you are ready. Please start with row 1 and then proceed to the next row until you have made a choice in each row. In each row, you have to decide between 200 tokens (option B: "in 3 months") and a smaller amount of tokens (option A: "today"). The amount at the right end of the table (option B) is always the same. Only the amounts on the left side (option A) change from row to row. Make sure to consider the different dates for options A and B. Click the submit button below once you have filled out every row.
Instructions for the pro-social cheating experiment
In the pro-social cheating experiment subjects could not earn money for themselves in the die-rolling task; instead they could earn money for another participant.
Task A: Die-rolling task
In this part you will be randomly assigned to another participant who is here today.
This part consists of 10 rounds. In each round you can earn up to 30 tokens for the other participant. The profits from each round will be added up.
In each round, you will be asked to roll a die and report the outcome of the die roll. Use the die and cup in front of you. The die number you report in a round determines the payoff of the other participant in that round. You can check how much you earn for the other participant in the payoff table at the bottom of the screen.
Example for the table below: If you roll a 3, the other participant's income increases by 0 tokens. If you roll a 4, the other participant's income increases by 30 tokens etc.
Payment:
If task A is selected for payment of the other participant, he or she will receive the total profit from all 10 rounds.
The other participants will also perform the die-rolling task and you will be randomly assigned to another participant as well. If this task will be selected for your payment, you will receive the total profit generated by the other participant.
Please click the OK button to start the task. Please complete this task now using the cup at your table.
Number rolled Payoff for the other participant Supporting Figures   Fig. S1 . Schematic Display of the tDCS electrode localization procedure. For the 43 participants with a T1-weighted anatomical MR image, we localized the scalp position overlying the DLPFC coordinate reported in Greene and Paxton (8) to be activated when participants successfully resisted lying. Each red dot represents one such location; the size of the dot represents the number of cases where this location was identified. This illustrates that for all participants, these locations lay in close proximity in an area demarcated by 4 standardized electrode positions in the Waveguard-Duke cap system. We therefore used this cap system in all remaining participants without an MR image to position the tDCS electrode (drawn to real size as red rectangle) so as to cover all possible locations of the DLPFC coordinate. (13), and a mood questionnaire (MDBF) (14) . Thereafter, anodal, cathodal or sham tDCS was applied over subjects' rDLPFC. During the stimulation phase, subjects first filled out a life satisfaction questionnaire and then performed four independent tasks (die-rolling task, dictator game, investment task, delay discounting task) in randomized order. In the post-stimulation phase subjects completed another mood questionnaire (MDBF) followed by a final questionnaire.
Fig. S3.
Simulations and Bayesian analyses demonstrate that our findings are very unlikely to reflect random fluctuations in the die roll outcomes. The plots in A, B, and C show kernel densities of the percentages of successful die rolls resulting from 100,000 simulated samples assuming n*10 truthfully reported die rolls (i.e., 50 % success rate), where n corresponds to the actual sample size of the different tDCS groups: Sham n=47 (A), Cathodal n=49 (B), and Anodal n=49 (C). The red vertical lines represent the observed average percentage of successful die rolls in the original data. Note that these lines lie outside of or at the very edge of the simulated distributions (all p < 0.0005), demonstrating that we can be very confident that participants in all groups lied to some degree. D displays the kernel density for the differences in successful die rolls between anodal and sham tDCS for each of the 100,000 simulated samples, assuming that each die roll is generated by a binomial process with a success rate of 50% (i.e., truthful reporting), 65%, or 80% (i.e., incomplete cheating to different degrees). The red vertical line indicates the tDCS effect observed in the original data. The observed tDCS effect lies at the very edge of the probability distributions (all p < 0.001). Given our sample size, it is thus extremely unlikely that the effect of anodal tDCS reflects random fluctuations in the outcomes of the die-rolling task. Panels E, F, and G show the posterior probability distributions over all possible die success rates that may have generated the observed data from our empirical sample. These distributions are all clearly shifted to the right of the 50% benchmark (red vertical line); the posterior probability that our sample of participants lied at least to some degree is p > 0.999999995. Panel H shows the posterior probability of all possible differences in die success rates underlying responses in the anodal and sham tDCS group. A null effect of tDCS would correspond to no difference in these rates (red vertical line at 0%), whereas a tDCS-induced decrease Anodal -Sham in cheating would correspond to negative numbers. The posterior probability distribution lies almost fully to the left of 0%. Thus, after observing our specific dataset, the posterior probability that tDCS reduced cheating is p = 0.9995 and there is a posterior probability of p = 0.95 that anodal tDCS reduced the die success rate by more than 5%.
Fig. S4.
Simulation and Bayesian analysis show that the different effects of anodal tDCS in the main versus pro-social experiment are unlikely to reflect random fluctuations in the die-rolling task. A displays the kernel densities for the simulated differences in the effects of anodal tDCS between the main and pro-social cheating experiment, based 100,000 simulated samples, assuming that each die roll is generated by a binomial process with a success rate of 50% (i.e., truthful reporting), 65%, or 80% (i.e., incomplete cheating to different degrees). The red vertical line indicates the interaction effect observed in the original data. The observed interaction effect lies at the edge of all three distributions (all p < 0.01). B displays the posterior probability distribution across the possible differences in the tDCS effects between the main and the prosocial cheating experiment. This distribution was generated with the same method as for Figure S3 . As virtually the full distribution lies in the domain of negative numbers, the reduction in lying due to anodal tDCS is indeed highly likely (p=0.9981) to be larger for the main experiment than for the prosocial cheating experiment. The 95% confidence interval (dashed lines) and the median (solid black line) show that the difference between experiments in their tDCS effects on die success rates is highly likely (p=0.95) to be larger than 4 % and most likely to be 11%. Tables   Table S1 . Power analysis demonstrates that out sample is sufficiently large to detect effects of medium size with 80% power. This table reports the results of the power analysis using Stata 14. We assumed a sample size of 50 observations per treatment. The first column contains the assumption we made about the standard deviation (based on existing data from similar tasks (20) (21) (22) 27) for each experimental task. The second column contains the minimum detectable effect size for a significance level of 5% and a power of 80%. The final column contains the Cohen's d, as a standardized measure of the minimum detectable effect. Table S2 . Descriptive statistics of the individual background variables for the main experiment (n = 145). The variable 'age' is measured in years; 'single', 'Swiss', and major of study (i.e., 'math', 'medicine', 'law', 'economics', 'social sciences' and 'non student') are binary variables; 'monthly income' is the amount of Swiss francs available to cover living expenses each month; 'cognitive skills (CRT)' is subjects' score (0 to 3) from the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) (13) ; 'machiavellism' is the subjects' score (-3 to +3) on the machiavellism scale (MACH IV) (22) ; 'positive Mood (t = 0)', 'wakefulness (t = 0)', and 'calmness (t = 0)' are sub-scales (4 to 20) of the multidimensional mood questionnaire (MDBF) (14) administered in the pre-stimulation phase. The last column presents p-values for the null hypothesis of perfect randomization (χ2 tests in case of binary variables and KruskalWallis tests in case of interval variables). Table S3 . Descriptive statistics of the individual background variables for the prosocial cheating experiment (n = 156). The variable 'age' is measured in years; 'single', 'Swiss', and major of study (i.e., 'math', 'medicine', 'law', 'economics', 'social sciences' and 'non student') are binary variables; 'monthly income' is the monthly available amount of cash in Swiss francs; 'cognitive skills (CRT)' is subjects' score (0 to 3) from the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) (13) ; 'machiavellism' is the subjects' score (-3 to +3) on the machiavellism scale (MACH IV) (22) (e) The fifth model includes subjects' investments in the ambiguity and risk task as well as their average impulsivity measured in the delay discounting task. (f) The last model includes all controls simultaneously. The second row from the bottom displays the pvalues from Wald tests for the null hypothesis that the coefficients for anodal and cathodal tDCS are equal. Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Table S6 . Effect of anodal tDCS on self-interested and pro-social cheating (decision to report a die roll as successful). Probit estimates. Reported results are average marginal effects. Robust standard errors, corrected for clustering at the individual level, are displayed in parenthesis. (a) The decision to report a successful die roll is regressed on dummy variables for the anodal and cathodal tDCS treatment in the main experiment (self-interested cheating) and the prosocial cheating experiment (n = 301). We include a dummy for the self-interested cheating experiment and an interaction term between this dummy and the anodal tDCS treatment dummy. (b) The second model includes additional controls for age, gender, relationship status, Swiss nationality, monthly amount of cash available, cognitive skills, machiavellism, major of studies, and baseline mood, wakefulness and calmness. Because one subject failed to respond to some questions, the number of observations drops when adding covariates (n = 300). Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Table S7 . Effect of anodal tDCS on self-interested and pro-social cheating (number of successful die rolls). OLS estimates. Robust standard errors are displayed in parentheses. (a) The number of successful die rolls is regressed on dummy variables for the anodal and cathodal tDCS treatment in the main experiment (self-interested cheating) and the pro-social cheating experiment (n = 301). We include a dummy for the self-interested cheating experiment and an interaction term between this dummy and the anodal tDCS treatment dummy. (b) The second model includes additional controls for age, gender, relationship status, Swiss nationality, monthly amount of cash available, cognitive skills, machiavellism, major of studies, and baseline mood, wakefulness and calmness. Because one subject failed to respond to some questions, the number of observations drops when adding covariates (n = 300). Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Table S10. Effect of tDCS on self-interested behavior. Self-interest I, II, and III is the percentage of the endowment that is kept in the dictator game with the Red Cross, UNICEF and Médecins Sans Frontières. The Kruskal-Wallis test in the last row demonstrates that tDCS did not have any significant influence on any of these behavioral measures. SEM = standard error of the mean. Table S11 . Effect of tDCS on impulsive behavior. Impulsivity I, II, and III is the average number of impatient choices (0 to 20) in the delay discounting task when subjects had to choose between "today vs. in 3 months," "today vs. in 6 months," and "in 3 months vs. in 6 months." Present bias is the difference in the number of impatient choices between "today vs. in 3 months" and "in 3 months vs. in 6 months." The Kruskal-Wallis test in the last row demonstrates that tDCS did not have any significant influence on any of these behavioral measures. SEM = standard error of the mean. Table S12 . Effect of anodal tDCS on other types of behavioral conflicts (pooled sample). The data in this table are based on the pooled sample from the main experiment and the pro-social cheating experiment. Self-interest measures the average percentage of the endowment subjects kept for themselves in the three dictator games. Risk (Ambiguity) is the percentage of the endowment invested into a lottery with known (unknown) outcome probabilities. Impulsivity is the average number of impatient choices (0-20) made in three delay discounting tasks. See methods for details. The rank-sum tests in the second last row show that anodal tDCS did not significantly influence any of these measures of conflict resolution at a 5% significance level. SEM = standard error of the mean.
